The objective of this study is to examine whether published investment advice generates higher returns for investors. We investigate the impact of security recommendations in the financial press on common stock prices in Istanbul Stock Exchange. Recommendations of Investor Ali column of the weekly-published popular economics journal Moneymatik constitutes our sample. The column is designed to inform individual investors about company prospects and use them as the basis for its recommendations. The results show that the published investment advice in this column does not help small investors earn excess returns. On the contrary, it provides a valuable deal to its 'preferred investors', if any, in selecting the stocks. If one could front-run the column's recommendations by five days he/she could earn more than 5% per week in excess of the index return. Compounded annually the excess return of a preferred investor could earn would be more than an amazing 1500% per annum.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Small investors utilise investment advice. Low cost financial publications in press, brokerage house recommendations and recently, the web sites that give totally free information and analysis are just a few examples of investment advice available to small investors. We examined whether published investment advice generates higher returns for small investors by investigating the impact of security recommendations in the financial press on common stock prices at Istanbul Stock Exchange. Istanbul stock Exchange is established in 1986 and is the 8 th largest exchange in Europe. Today more than 250 shares are traded in two sessions on a daily basis. The daily volume of trade is about $800 million and market capitalisation is about $13 billion as of the year 2000.
Recommendations of Investor Ali column of the weekly-published popular economics journal Moneymatik (Paramatik in Turkish) constitutes our sample. The name of the journal makes associations with automatic and ATM machines, and implies that the journal is for those who want manage their investments profitably. Ali is very a common and widely held name in Turkey and the title of the column (Investor Ali) implies that the column is designed for the man on the street, i.e. the small investor.
As one of the most widely read features of the Moneymatik, the column has been published weekly since the periodical was introduced in 1993. The coverage of the column includes analysis of macroeconomic conditions as well as the analysis of a single firm or a group of firms. The column is designed to attract individual investors with its informal language and overconfident attitude in the analysis of firm specific information.
Small investors utilise information throughout their decision-making processes from various sources but mainly from the financial media and web-based brokerage house recommendations (Muradoglu, 2000) . Web-based, free of charge recommendations can be reached by those who have access to and who are skilled in using computers.
Brokerage houses and investment banks usually distribute financial analysts' research reports to larger clients without charge in the expectation that brokerage commissions will be generated. Reading the comments in popular economic periodicals is a low cost way of gathering information for most individual investors. These magazines claim that they provide the widest dissemination of information.
Investment advice that individual investors utilize might also be a basis for insidertrading if the column is well known. Advice can, then, generate trading volume, which insiders can exploit. "Heard on the Street" column of the daily Wall Street Journal had been involved in an insider trading scandal, which was revealed on March 29, 1984. It was uncovered that an author of the "Heard on the Street" column leaked information about the content and the timing of the forthcoming column to some stockbrokers and then shared the illegal gains with them. Afterwards, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed criminal charges against the author and brokers.
They were finally convicted of fraud and conspiracy for illegally profiting from market sensitive information.
Several authors presented evidence that there is significant abnormal stock price performance on the day of publication of "Heard on the Street" column (Lloyds Davies and Canes, 1978) . They interpreted this result to suggest that analysts provide information to their clients and that the secondary dissemination of analysts' recommendations in the "Heard on the Street" column has an effect on stock prices.
Their findings have received support from more recent studies by Liu, Smith and Syed (1990) and Beneish (1991) . However, both of these latter papers also found a significant price impact during the two days preceding the publication. Beneish (1991) investigated alternative explanations for the significant stock price reaction to analysts' information reported in "Heard on the Street" column and indicated that the column was not usually a secondary dissemination. Beneish's (1991) evidence suggests that "Heard on the Street" gathers information, forms a consensus, and provides it to investors.
In the Istanbul Stock Exchange, Kiymaz (1999) investigated the effect of stock market gossip published in weekly economics magazine Ekonomik Trend between July 1996 and August 1997. He concluded that statistically significant abnormal returns in the pre-publication period existed and this would possibly be a sign of the profitable use of insider information by those who posses the information initially. Kiymaz (1999) has worked with a limited sample and the column he investigated was presented as dissemination of several analysts' recommendations.
So far, neither the Investor Ali case that we present in this paper, nor the Ekonomik Trend case has been punished for insider trading. There is a grey area whereby it is extremely difficult to distinguish between privileged customers and insiders. In Europe insider trading is mainly understood as illegal trading based on the privileged information held by major shareholders or managers. Issues in the grey area where small investors are involved do not attract much attention. A former British stockbroker in London 1 kindly informed us that practice to the one we report in this paper is pretty common in London. He explained that analysts might have privileged clients with whom they share their recommendations before written material is produced and disseminated. Therefore, we would like to be as sceptic as one can be in discussing the results of this study.
We simply examine the security market reaction to the publication of investment advice in a periodical in the case of Istanbul Stock Exchange. The distinct characteristics of the Turkish case will be explained in detail in the following sections.
We only investigate if published investment advice is helpful to small investors in generating excess returns. In doing so, we investigate excess returns for possible front-runners and long-term investors as robustness checks. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the data and methodology, Section III presents the findings and discussion, and Section IV concludes the paper. Following Werner and Brown (1984) the abnormal return on stock i on day t, AR it is defined as the difference between the return on stock i ( R it ) and the return on the market ( M t ).
(1)
AR it = R it -M t where ISE-100 composite index represents the market (M t )and stock returns are defined as the close to close percentage change in the price levels. The average abnormal returns on n stocks at day t, AR t is given as;
For n securities, average cumulative abnormal returns T days after the event date, ACAR T is the sum of average abnormal returns over that period:
The t-statistics for ACAR T is computed as,
In this study we considered an event window that starts on day t=-19 and ends on t=20 and the t-tests are carried out for this event window. The longer event window adopted here enables us to observe the possible existence of persistent abnormal returns after the event as well as price recovery before the event.
III. RESULTS
The results indicate that the publication of the Investor Ali column has a significant impact on stock prices. Results presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 show that the average Cumulative Abnormal Return (ACAR) starts picking up on day t = -8. During the period covering t = -8 to t = -2, ACAR increases from -0.8% to 0.7%. A clear jump at the ACAR from 0.7% to 3.0% can be observed at the one business day before
Investor Ali advises the stock on Sunday. After the advice appears in Moneymatik on Sunday, ( t = 0 ) another significant jump to 5.39% can be observed. ***** Insert Tables 1 and Figure 1 here ***** On the event date, which is the first Monday after investment advice is published, the abnormal returns are approximately 2.35%. After the event date ( t = +1), the ACAR is almost constant at 5.4% and then decays gradually to 2.0% on day t = +20. So, between t = +1 and t = +20, we observe negative ACAR of -3.4%.
We examine the ACARs during the one-week before and after the publication of the Investor Ali column (t=-5 to t=+5). Table 2 and Figure 2 report results for the ten day event window. We observe that cumulative abnormal returns increase from zero (t=5) to 3.0% (t=-1) in one week until the Friday just before the publication of the Journal on Sunday. On the Monday, which is the first trading day following the publication of investment advice ACAR jumps to 5.39% (t=0) and remain constant during the rest of the week. On the Friday following the publication of the column ACAR is stable at 5.35% (t=+5). ***** Insert Table 2 Figure 2here ***** Despite the poor performance in the short run investment advice might be valuable in the long run. The forty day event window we use in Table 1 is far too short to evaluate the long term value of the columnist's advice. It is argued that equity investments must be held over a long period to realise their full value 2 . We investigate long run returns during a two year period. We report the weekly cumulative abnormal returns for two years until week 104, following the recommendations of the Investor Ali column in Table 3 and Figure 3 . ******insert Table 3 and Figure 3 here***** ACARs are negative throughout the two year period following the columnist's advice.
ACARs systematically decline from zero to -8.4% in six months (week=26) and to 10.0% (week=52) at the end of the first year. The decline continues during the second year and ACAR is -13.6% (week=78) eighteen months after the publication of advice, and remain stable at -13.9% (week=104) until the end of the second year following the recommendation of the columnist. Clearly the Investor Ali column is not adding any long term value to small investors.
Lloyds Davies and Canes (1978) interpret similar abnormal price movements in the US by suggesting that the "Heard on the Street" column is a secondary dissemination of analysts' recommendations. However, this can hardly be the explanation for our case. Investor Ali claims that his recommendations are based on his own analyses and do not refer to any financial analyst or street gossip. He often feels the need to state this to differentiate himself from similar columns in other popular economic periodicals. Similar to Liu, Smith and Syed (1990) , Beneish (1991) and Kiymaz (1999), we too cannot exclude the possibility of the insider trading during the short time period between Investor Ali's recommendations being submitted to the periodical and the publication of the column. However we are not in a position to make such a claim either.
The significant abnormal returns preceding the publication of the column might very well be due to chance or due to trading based upon speculation or knowledge about the contents of the forthcoming Investor Ali column. One possible story can be the trading of 'preferred investors' who reach the information before the publication day.
After investment advice is published, there is a tremendous demand on the first trading day by individual investors, which moves ACAR by almost 2.4%. After the event date, 'preferred investors' might have started selling the stocks that they have already accumulated in the preceding week and exploit the excess returns. If investment advice were given to the magazine on Monday (t = -5) and if this information were tipped to 'preferred investors', they could have bought the stocks five trading days before the publication of the advice. They could have easily sold their stocks after the investment advice had become public information at (t = 0). Therefore, they could have earned a weekly average return of 7.11% and weekly average abnormal return of 5.36% (see Table 2 ) that would easily cover two-way transaction costs of 0.5% on market average. This corresponds to the remarkable annually compounded return of 1511%.
We run an investment strategy for the front-runners by buying at (t = -5) and selling at (t = 0) for the 206-week research period. We find that an investment of TL Figure 4 here ***** Individual investors can have the information only after it has been published. So, they do not have a chance to buy the stock before (t = 0). In this case we can only run an investment strategy to buy at (t = 0) when the ACAR is 5.39% and sell at (t = +4) when ACAR is 5.35% (see Table 1 buy when ( t = -5 ) and sell when ( t = 0 ). Series 2 represents the long term returns to the strategy for small investors; buy when ( t = 0 ) and sell when ( t = +4 )
